問鼎 | Weighing the Cauldrons: A Critical History of China from Antiquity to Modernity

This divine principle—that true nobility lies in righteousness and mutual understanding—must guide our approach to history. For how can we be wise without true understanding, and how can understanding be built upon anything but an honest pursuit of truth?

A contradiction appears to the astute reader. First you claim that true value lies in righteousness and understanding, but then you challenge the assertion made by the Zhōu minister. If morality is your primary concern, then how come you “weigh the cauldron”? To this I say that understanding cannot be constructed upon anything but the raw pursuit of truth. If we allow ourselves to be guided by idealised versions of history, one may not get to the true nature of things, which will lead to a partial kind of wisdom, one that may not cover the scope of reality. Therefore, morality and tangible reality is the same aim, one cannot be reached without the other.

Every deed, great or small, is judged by its intentions. This project has three. First, it seeks to provide a clear and compelling narrative of Chinese history—the dynasties, the philosophers, the poems, and the pivotal moments that every educated person should know. Yet, writing an uncritical history based on traditional sources risks telling a one sided, elitist, moralising narrative. On the other hand, writing one solely based on modern research risks alienating the foundational beliefs on which modern Chinese identity is constructed. Due to this “dual-track” of Chinese history, I choose to present both. So, it seeks to pull back the curtain on that very narrative. We will see how the history was written: how each dynasty crafted stories about the past to legitimize its own rule. To do this, we will travel on two parallel roads: the well-paved highway of the traditional chronicles, and the newer, sometimes rockier paths cut by archaeology and modern scholarship. Third, and above all, this book traces the evolution of the idea that made all of this history cohere: the concept of Zhōngguó—the ‘Central State’—as a place, a civilization, a people, and a legitimizing idea. It is this idea that you, the reader, are now reconnecting with.

In the Sinosphere, knowledge of Chinese history is widespread and common, after all, the school curriculums in those countries focus on their own history, and this innate knowledge permeates through their societies. Historical references are hidden in idioms, schoolchildren recite ancient poems with ease, historical dramas, video games, and other manifestations of pop-culture take place in historical Chinese settings with events and characters familiar to the consumers. This deep familiarity is a hallmark of a cultural successor. Unfortunately, due to the education, reading habits, and entertainment consumed by many diaspora Chinese outside of the Sinosphere, I have noticed that some of us have, sadly, missed out on developing an intimate relationship with the stories and histories that shaped our civilisation. When we do engage with the material, we are often guided by politicized and curated versions of Chinese history. This is regrettable. It is my sincere hope that this project will be able to universalise Chinese historical knowledge to my fellow diaspora Chinese brethren, without moralising or curating pre-digested opinions, which is, frankly, infantilising.

I choose to do this in English because many of us no longer speak or read Chinese, much less at a level capable of understanding history books, as such, easily accessible English language material is a necessity to disseminating this knowledge. There is a saying in Chinese, it reads jiāyù hùxiǎo, known to every home and hearth—household knowledge. If this project succeeds in inspiring at least one person, Chinese or not, to learn more about Chinese history, then I will rest easy knowing that there has been a beneficial contribution to the distribution of understanding.

Approach

I will follow the traditional Chinese way to look at Chinese history, which is dynastic. I find this is most helpful because history in China is also ordered in this way, not just academically, but in lay discourse as well. If I used any other designation, and you mainly used my articles to study Chinese history, you’d find yourself lost. E.g. when grandpa explains that “We are Hàn” or “Let’s go to Táng-people-street (Chinatown)”, you should know what he means by that. Therefore, the Procrustean geography bound eras of Western history (classical age, medieval era, early modern period, modern era, etc.) will not be imposed upon Chinese history. Instead, we will start at the Xià dynasty, go through each of the successive eras of Shāng, Zhōu, Spring and Autumn, Warring States, Qín, etc. all the way up to Qīng, and post-Imperial China.

Given the scale of this project, it would be impossible to complete it within my lifetime if I were to conduct in-depth research on every era and topic in Chinese history. As such, this project is heavily indebted to scholars around the world who have devoted themselves to understanding Chinese history in its full-depth. They are the labourers who took the time to grow the fruit and harvest it. I am the one who takes the fruits of their labour and lays them before you in a fruit stall, hopefully in a coherent and attractive manner. As a salesman, I hope you will buy all the fruit, but of course, am aware that not everyone has the capacity (time-wise or interest wise) to sit down and digest it all. Therefore, I will structure this project in a way that will make each topic I address a separate article. I will write chronologically and bring out articles successively. I will include the list of articles below so that one can navigate to the desired topics using this article as a hub. This way, readers will be able to benefit from the research much sooner than if I were to publish this beast of a project all at once when it is finished. You’d be able to pick and choose which fruit is to your liking, and take it from there.

The History of Dynastic Cycles: an Introduction

Chinese history does not follow the same eras as European history. This is understandable since Europe developed in a different way than China through the ages. Where we in the West are familiar with the Stone Age, Bronze Age, Iron Age, Classical Era, Middle Ages, Early Modern Era, the Modern Era, and the Post-Modern Era once you leave Europe, the ages after Stone, Bronze and Iron suddenly become less relevant. In fact, they are fundamentally incompatible concepts for areas outside of Europe. Naturally, since China has been far removed in terms of societal patterns from the West for most of its history, it follows a different structure that is based on the then ruling Imperial dynasty.

For example, to mention an important Chinese era, we have the Qín Era. The Qín Era was ruled over by the family of Yíngzhèng. Once his lineage was deposed by Xiàngyǔ of the Chǔ and Liú Bāng, the Qín era came to an end. Thereafter we have the rise of the Hàn era, which was ruled over by the Liú clan all the way until their fall into shambles by the time of the Three Kingdoms. This example is the traditional model through which Chinese history is viewed. One virtuous clan rises and takes the realm, having secured the Mandate of Heaven, but declines due to moral decay and incompetence. The land falls into strife—signalling that the Mandate of Heaven is lost—and a new clan rises from the chaos, claiming the Mandate of Heaven and establishes a new dynasty.

So, we divide Chinese history by which ruling clan was sat on the throne, this is called a dynasty. Each dynasty had their own characteristics, idiosyncracies, and aesthetics. Just as easily a European may recognise that a toga and sandal wearing man is Republican or early Imperial Roman, a person versed in Chinese history will recognise a top-knot and round-neck robe will be someone from the Táng.

This dynastic structure lasted until 1912, when the Gehungge Yoso—the Xuāntōng Emperor, Aisingioro Pǔyí—abdicated. An attempt by Yuan Shikai was made to establish his own empire, but after a hundred days, his dynasty crumbled into dust, thereby ending over two millennia of Imperial rule. From then on, Chinese historiography speaks of modern history.

One could argue that Modern China operates within this structural pattern, though it has replaced the traditional Mandate of Heaven with a modern legitimizing ideology. The claim to rule is now based on a materialist mandate of historical necessity and national rejuvenation, rather than virtue in the classical sense. Furthermore, the current era of CCP rule, while long-lasting by modern standards, is not yet longer than the periods of disunity that have historically separated major dynasties.

The limits of the framework

It is important to understand that this is the emic framework I use to structure Chinese history with because it is a very powerful tool for understanding the traditional narrative and folk consciousness of Chinese history. Yet I am fully aware of some of its shortcomings inhjerent to this approach. Below I will list three of them.

• A glaring problem with the dynastic structure occurs at the origins: Early China. China did not have Imperial dynasties, certainly none that governed all of China proper before Qin. So to classify this era as part of the dynastic cycle simplifies the complex and multipolar world of Early China, and risks projecting a later imperial reality onto an earlier period in which these developments had not taken place. Moreover, this field of study has, since the last century, benefited the most from modern scholarship, and as such, has deviated arguably the most from traditional historiography owing to paleography, archaeology and philology. Our treatment of this era must therefore balance respect for the traditional narrative with the findings of modern scholarship.
• The traditional dynastic cycle seeks to neatly divide the past into eras while reality was much more messy. There were periods with multiple claimants to the Mandate of Heaven (and thus can simultaneously be seen as legitimate China), periods of de facto chaos where the de jure ruler was little more than a mascot. The dynastic structure forces these periods to belong to one dynasty or the other, this may obscure the underlying reality of the era.
• Significant developments or trends transcend dynastic boundaries. For example, the continuous adaptation and development of gunpowder technology, the increasingly permeable and shifting steppe frontier, the development of true cavalry, or the slow drift of ancient Chinese, the long-term effects of climate change, etc. Given that there are cross-dynastic trends, discussing these developments does not fit neatly into the traditional dynastic cycle. A strictly dynastic narrative risks fragmenting these continuous processes into disjointed episodes, which would defeat a core purpose of this project: to synthesize the full scope of Chinese history from a singular perspective, thereby making these deep currents more visible.

The reasons above are why I will use this dynastic structure as the primary organising chronology, but not as its only analytical lens. It is a powerful and authentic organizing principle, not an unassailable truth. Where necessary, thematic articles will cut across dynastic boundaries to trace these deeper currents of change.

A Timeline of Chinese History

Below I have included a timeline [work in progress!] with the Chinese dynasties. Whenever the Chinese civilisation comes in close contact, usually through war (that later also becomes part of China as a direct result of them conquering China) I have included them in the timeline. This includes, for example, the Xiongnu, the Khitans, and the Mongols, but not the Japanese or the Tibetan Empire. The nations that were once part of the Chinese Empire that ruled from China but split away later, such as Mongolia, are included in this timeline. Vietnam is not explicitely mentioned, even though it has been at times part of some of the Chinese dynasties. Also not represented are the various smaller nations of the Miao or Yi people that have popped up through the ages. The minority nations of China have actually been present in the territory that is now China for all of history. The expansion of the Chinese Imperial dynasties have gradually caused the surrounding nations to be absorbed, assimilated, or driven away. These nations are manifold and have been left out of the timeline. Also not mentioned are any of colonial powers that have occupied or leased Chinese territory, such as the Dutch, English, French, Russians, Germans, Japanese, and Portuguese.

Please note that not all nations listed in this timeline have been officially recognised by other nations. Whether or not such a nation is on the timeline usually depends on the de facto status of a place. For example, Tunganistan was never an official country, but the locals called their leader a Padishah (king), so the situation of the time warrants the listing of this place as a separate entity rather than a normal province of the Republic of China. The same is true for countries that have proclaimed their own independence, but have not gotten recognition from everyone, such as Tibet, the Pingnan Sultanate, or the Bogd Khan’s Great Mongolian State. The appearance of these places on the timeline does in no way represent an endorsement or tacit recognition of their independence, and is merely a reflection of the historical events that took place.

The Republican era features many so called cliques. These were semi-independent warlords resulting from the power vacuum left when the Qing Empire collapsed. Each provincial governor or military leader gained de facto independence while pledging their allegiance to the newly formed Chinese Republic. Many of these warlords never declared independence, and therefore, they cannot be regarded as a separate nation, but they did vie for power with each other. The warlord era ended when the Nationalist Government launched their Northern Expedition to reign in all the warlords and put an end to the division. The warlords did not cease to have power, but pledged their allegiance to the Nationalist Government, and were usually enlisted into the Nationalist Government army. On my timeline, it appears that many of the cliques cease to exist from 1928 onwards, but in actuality, they were incorporated into the Nationalist Army.

As a final note, I have attempted to put regimes that cover the same geographic areas in roughly the same vertical column. For example, the regime of Yaqub Beg (Yettishar) is placed directly above the later Xinjiang clique, which is followed by the Turkic Islamic Republic, Tunganistan, and the East Turkestan Republic, which are all put underneath each other so as to denote that one regime follow the other. The same goes for states that are successors of previous states regimes, such as the Northern Han being a successor to the Later Han. In some cases, multiple states emerge out of a single one, such as Zhao, Han, and Wei emerging out of Jin during the Warring States Era. Due to lack of space, the do not fit in the same vertical column, please do not be confused about this. Please forgive the fact that I have not been able to be entirely consistent with this. The states that occupy modern day Mongolia roughly correspond with the right side of the timeline. However, as you can see, areas within China shift around regularly on the x-axis of the chart.

[I will put the timeline here, in shaa Allah]